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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE DURHAM DECISION: A RECOGNITION OF MEDICAL
CONCEPTS IN THE DETERMINATION OF
CREIINAL RESPONSIBILITY
INTRODUCTION
"An over-organized civilization requires, apart from indi-
vidualistic virtues, a sense for coordination and order; and al-
though the traditional ideals need not be abandoned, they must be
modified and adjusted to new conditions . . .. The 'land of the
free and the home of the brave' is in process of becoming a home
of order. 1
Dr. Alexander's augury of social order advancement is the
statement of an ideal by a psychiatrist toward the attainment of
which it is the primary business of the law to strive. The state-
ment further represents the necessary common ground upon which
the legal and medical professions must meet in order that mutual
problems may find satisfactory solution.
The profound effect upon the social structure brought about
by the problem of insanity, a legal term, and its treatment in the
administration of criminal law demands an enlightened coopera-
tive effort between medicine and law: a recognition of deficiencies
of approach, a candid evaluation of the efficacy of existing prac-
tices, and an integrated presentation of modes of improvement. It
is in the light of this common purpose that the Durham" decision
must be viewed.
PRE-Duna~m: M NAGHTEN AND THE IRRESISTIBLE IMPULSE
Prior to the fourteenth century insanity was not treated as a
defense to crime in England," and until the seventeenth century,
authorities are so vague in their writings concerning insanity as a
legal problem that even their historical value is limited.4 The rea-
son for this, in large part, was the emphasis in lunacy law upon
the property rights of "moon-gazers" and idiots. Insane per-
sons without property were thus given little consideration in cases
of criminal behavior6 and in some sections of Europe in medieval
times, the defense of insanity in a criminal proceeding was spe-
cifically prohibited.7 It was not until the seventeenth century8 that
1. ALEXANDER, M. D., Oum AGE OF UNREASON, 257 (1951).
2. Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 862 (D. C. Cir. 1954).
3. DEUTSCH, MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA, 388 (1937).
4. 3 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRImINAL LAW OF ENGLAND, 150 (1883).
5. DEUTSCH, op. cit. sumpra note 3, at 388.
6. Lunacy and Idiocy--the Old Law and its Incubus, 18 U. oF CHI. L. REV. 361
(1950).
7. DEUTSCH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 389.
8. Ibid.
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tests were evolved to aid in the determination of the degree of in-
sanity required in order that one might be free from criminal re-
sponsibility.9 Sir Matthew Hale considered only total insanity
sufficient to a defense in criminal cases.' In Arnold's Case Judge
Tracy laid down the "Wild Beast" test whereby the insane per-
son was thought of as not far removed from those natural denizens
of the forest." At the turn of the eighteenth century the Hadfield
Case2 evidenced a test which was a departure from that of total
insanity as set forth by Hale, and established that the single symp-
tom of delusion constituted sufficient mental abnormality to relieve
one of criminal responsibility. 3  Late in the eighteenth century,
however, Hawkins described a test for irresponsibility which has
influenced the classical definition of legal insanity known as the
M'Naghten Rule: the ability to distinguish between "good and
evil". Just prior to the M'Naghten case, however, an unsuccess-
ful assassin of Queen Victoria, one Oxford, was afforded a charge
to the jury by Lord Denman suggestive of the test known today
as the "irresistible impulse" test;'5 but such did not become a test
in England.'
The Right and Wrong Test: Daniel M'Naghten, a paranoic
suffering from delusions of persecution, was acquitted of homicide
in 1843 "by reason of insanity."'1  The verdict caused such a pub-
lic stir that debate in the House of Lords ensued, and it was there
9. Ibid.
10. 1 HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 30 (1678). Hale stated that
"the best measure for total insanity" is whether the accused has the mental capacity of
a child of fourteen years due to an affliction of "melancholy distempers." This test for
insanity was later strongly criticized by Sir James Fitzjames Stephens, an eminent legal
writer of the times, in 1889:
Surely no two states of mind can be more unlike than that of a healthy boy of
fourteen and that of a man laboring under melancholy distempers. The one is
healthy immaturity, the other diseased maturity and between them there is no
sort of resemblance. 2 Stephens, History of the Criminal Law in England 150-1
(1883).
11. Arnold's Case, 16 How. St. Tr. (1724): "It is not every kind of frantic
humor or something unaccountable in a man's actions, that points him out to be such a
madman as to be exempted from punishment; it must be a man that is totally deprived
of his understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is doing, no more than
an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast, such a one is never the object of punishment
12. 27 How. St. Tr. 1282 (1800). Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the
Hadfield Case was the grandiloquence of counsel for the defendant, Lord Erskine. See
also, WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CEINAL DEFENSE, 56-58 (1954).
13. Ibid.
14. "Those who are under a natural disability of distinguishing between good and
evil, as infants under the age of discretion, ideots (sic) and lunaticks (sic), are not
punishable by any criminal prosecution whatever. 1 Hawkin's, Pleas of the Crozwn
1 (1824).
15. Regina v. Oxford, 9 Car. & P. 525 (1840).
16. WEIHOFEN, op. cit. sumra note 12, at 59.
17. M'Naghtei's Case, 10 Clark & Fin. 200 (1843).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
decided to take the advisory opinion of the judges on the status
of the law governing such a case. 8 Of the fifteen judges deliber-
ating on the problem, fourteen decided upon two major rules to
guide the court in future cases which involved the issue of criminal
insanity: (A) ". . . it must be clearly proved that, at the time
of the committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know
the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or" (B.) ".. . if
he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong. "219
Justice Maule delivered a separate opinion in which
he established the knowledge of right and wrong as the sole cri-
terion of responsibility.20  It was the further opinion of the judges
that "partial delusions" were insufficient to relieve a man from
responsibility as long as he was "not in other respects insane. ' 2 1
The judges commented that the right and wrong referred to was
specifically with respect to the act charged; and that moral right
and wrong as well as legal right and wrong was embraced in their
definition.22 The right and wrong test has remained the sole test
of criminal responsibility in England23 and has been adopted as
such in twenty-nine states in America 4  The Victorian prose with
which the M'Naghten judges handed down their advisory opinion
has caused abundant confusion in interpretation and application,2 5
and the test of insanity which evolved therefrom has been strongly
criticized by legal 26 and medica 2 7 authorities alike.
18. Id. at 202.
19. Id. at 203-4.
20. Id. at 205.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid. See also People v. Schmidt, 216 N. Y. 324, 110 N. E. 945 (1915).
23. WHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 51.
24. Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin. In six of the states
(Louisiana, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota) the
right and wrong test is established by statute. Id. at 51, 69-72, 129 et seq.
25. Overholser, The Psychiatrist and the Law, 575 quoting professor Glueck's
concise statement as to the confusion that exists concerning the meaning of "right and
wrong" and the "nature and quality": "Some (states) cite the nature and quality ele-
ments in the test disjunctively with the right and wrong feature, some conjunctively."
26. 2 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIINAL LAW OF ENGLAND, 153 et seq. (1883);
Note, A Proposal for a Fountainhead of Rationality in the Jurisprudence of Insanity,
5 CATHOLIC UNIv. L. Ry. 63, 75-83 (1955).
27. GLU CK, MENTAL DIsORDER AND THE CRImINAL LAW, 166 (1925); ZILOORG,
MIND, MEDICINE AND MAN (1943) ; Tulin, The Problem of Mental Disorder in Crime:
A Survey, 32 COL. L. REv. 933 (1932); Menninger, Medico-Legal Proposals of the
.American Psychiatric Association, 19 J. Cans. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 367 (1928) ; see also,
GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW, c. 17, 18 (1952); Keedy,
Insanity and Criminal Responsibility, 30 HARv. L. REv. 535, 724 (1917).
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The Irresistible Impulse Test: Apart from the Oxford case,
England has been completely disassociated from the so-called
Irresistible Impulse standard for the determination of irresponsi-
bility." In at least fourteen states and the federal courts in
America, however, the irresistible impulse is a second test of ir-
responsibility.29 Under this test, even though the accused may be
able to distinguish right from wrong, yet if he suffers from such
mental disease that he cannot control his will power in consequence
of the disease, then he is not responsible for his criminal acts. 0
The legal problems presented upon attempted application of this
test are manifold ;81 the most recent medical opinion available em-
phatically denies the validity of the assumptions upon which it is
based;82 the rule has absolutely no philosophical foundations ;83
and its value as a standard has been characterized charitably as
adding ". . .very little to the usual consideration of responsibil-
ity in mental illness."34
New Hampshire's Solitary Stand: In the case of State v.
Pike,85 and its better-known ally, State v. Jones,6 New Hampshire
eliminated any legal test for the determination of legal insanity:
the jury first determines as a question of fact whether or not the
accused is suffering from a mental disease, or was at the time of
the alleged commission of the crime, and if so, whether the disease
was of such quality or degree as to incapacitate him from forming
the necessary criminal intent (mens rea). The dominant issue
in criminal cases involving insanity is thus "intent", and to the
determination of that issue medical and psychiatric evidence is
admitted "unfettered" by concomitant conclusions concerning de-
28. WEiHOFN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 59. But see Case of Ronald Trite, 16
Cr. App. R. 164, 169 (1922). After this decision, the Lord Chancellor appointed a
commission to investigate prevalent tests of insanity as a criminal defense. The Com-
mission did not approve the recommendation submitted by the British Medical Associa-
tion to this effect: "The legal criteria of responsibility express in the rule in M'Nagh-
ten's case should be abrogated and the responsibility of a person should be left as a ques-
tion of fact to be determined by the jury on the merits of the particular case." Rep.
Comm. on Insanity and Crime, Cmd. No. 2005, 4 (1923). See also note 36 infra.
29. Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and
Wyoming. The irresistable impulse test may also be recognized in Montana, New
Mexico, and Ohio. WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 52, 129 et seq.
30. Keedy, Irresistable Impulse in the Criminal Law, 100 U. oF PA. L. Rxv. 961
(1952).
31. B. g., Cavanagh, A Psychiatrist Looks at the Durham Decision, 5 CATHOLIC
UNIv. L. REv. 25, 41-45 (1955).
32. Ibid.
33. Nolan, Freedom of Will and the Irresistable Impulse, 5 CATHOLiC L. REv. 55-
62 (1955).
34. Cavanagh, op. cit. supra note 31, at 49.
35. 49 N. H. (1 Shirley) 399 (1870).
36. 50 N. H. (2 Shirley) 369, 398 (1871).
37. Ibid.
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gree of responsibility compelled by the "right and wrong" test.88
It was eighty-four years, however, before New Hampshire was
followed by another jurisdiction in the establishment of a "no
test" test for criminal responsibility.39 Finally, it appears that
in Rhode Island the court has never passed on the question of a
settled legal test ;40 and in Montana the court has so vacillated
between the right and wrong test, the irresistible impulse test and
the New Hampshire rule that the situation is quite unclear.41
TnE DURHAM DEcioSIO AND A SH FT OF JUDICIAL EMPHAsIS
In 1954 Monte Durham was convicted by the District Court in
the District of Columbia of housebreaking.42 Durham had a long
history of imprisonment and hospitalization, and his only defense
was that he was of unsound mind at the time of the crime. After
his indictment and prior to conviction he had been adjudged of
unsound mind by the affidavits of two psychiatrists and committed
to St. Elizabeth's Mental Hospital. Following sixteen months of
commitment, he was released on certificate of St. Elizabeth's that
he was mentally competent to stand trial and participate in his
own defense. The lower court decided (defendant waived his right
to a trial by jury) the defense of insanity had not been satisfac-
torily established under either the right and wrong test or the
irresistible impulse test.
The decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals (A.) be-
cause the lower court was in error in not finding that the defend-
ant had fulfilled the requirement of introducing " some evidence"
of insanity43 thus shifting the burden to the government to prove
defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, and (B.) because
both the right and wrong test and the irresistible impulse test as
exclusive criteria for the determination of criminal responsibility
are inadequate in view of existing medical knowledge." Involdng
its inherent power, the court then established the "new" test:
"The rule we now hold must be applied on the retrial of this case
and in future cases is not unlike that followed by the New Hamp-
shire courts since 1870.15 It is simply that an accused is not
criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of men-
tal disease or mental defect."4'  The court then defined the terms
38. See WEIHOFEN, op. cit. mpra note 12, at 113.
39. See note 2 supra.
40. See WEIHoFEN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 52.
41. Ibid.
42. See note 2 supra at 864.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Id. at 874.
46. Ibid.
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" mental disease " I and "mental defect' ": "We use 'disease' in the
sense of a condition which is considered capable of either improv-
ing or deteriorating. We use 'defect' in the sense of a condition
which is not considered capable of either improving or deteriorat-
ing and which may be either congenital, or the result of injury,
or the residual effect of a physical or mental disease. 4 7 Before
edifying the new test, the court made an exhaustive study of the
existing standards for the determination of criminal insanity, and
concluding that advancement in psychiatric knowledge and skill
had shown the old tests outmoded and ill-fitted to modern stand-
ards of scientific inquiry adopted the now well-known Durham
Bule. Thus the genesis of the new test, and thus an important
shift in judicial emphasis from purely socio-legal concepts in
regard to criminal insanity, to recent medico-psychiatric stand-
ards the substantial validity of which is yet to be determined.48
QUo VA nmvs?
Before an evaluation of the Durham test is attempted, it might
be well to consider some of the barriers to mutual understanding
which clearly exist between the medical and legal professions.
Certainly the problem of communication, caused by technical
language in both professions, represents a major obstacle to co-
operative action.49 In particular, psychiatrists are disdainful of
accepting legal terminology,"0 and although the point is well taken
in some instances, it has been stated that certain areas of dis-
agreement are quite superficial51
The difference in training and education is also upsetting to
plans of joint enterprise; and yet it has been recognized that the
all-important link between medicine and law is, after all, the wel-
fare of the human being.52
47. Id. at 875.
48. See RAY, MEnICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 34-47 (1st ed. 1838); ZI.-
B00RG, LEGAL ASPECTS OF PSYCHIATRY, 100 YEARS OF AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY, 1844-1944,
507, 552 (1944).
49. Criminal Responsibility and Psychiatric ExPert Testimony, Comm. on Psychiatry
and Law of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Rep. No. 26 (1954).
50. ZILBOORG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRImINAL ACT AND PUNISHMENT 125(1954) : "The psychiatrist . . . qualified to be a forensic psychiatrist . . . would act
against the ethical principles of the profession if he accepted the concept of legal in-
sanity; for clinical psychiatry does not know of such a condition, never saw it, and
after almost two hundred years of clinical investigation seriously doubts its existence."
51. Cavanagh, op. cit. sumra note 31 at 26: "Some of this difficulty is understand-
able, but certain words such as insanity and unsoundness of mind have real meaning
and should not be rejected because they are not 'medical terms and have no medical
meaning.'
52. Ibid.
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Finally, and perhaps the least justifiable of all the difficulties
existing between the two professions, a fundamental egotism in
both medicine and law unnecessarily befogs issues and prevents
mutual progressY3  Undoubtedly, a not prodigious amount of pa-
tience exercised by both would ameliorate the situation consider-
ably.
Durham Rule Under Scrutiny: Although long in arriving
and auspiciously regarded, the Durham Rule has already been the
subject of much scrutiny and some criticism." It has been con-
jectured that the effect on society might be negative in that the
defense becomes too easily available and too difficult to disprove.1
Further, it has been stated that the jury, who will now have the
task of determining responsibility without medical or psychiatric
opinion necessarily addressed to that point, will be confused by
psychiatric testimony based and admitted on multiple theories,
many of them conflicting in naturer °
The court in the Durham decision has been criticized for at-
tempting to do what it recognized a court cannot do: define
insanity.5 7 Further, the court has defined insanity in such a way
that most psychiatrists themselves will be confused as to its
meaning.58
On the other hand, it is almost universally agreed that a time
for some change had arrived, that the right and wrong and ir-
resistible impulse tests as exclusive criteria for the determination
of criminal insanity were clearly inadequate." 'What the future
holds in store for the further acceptance, and possible develop-
ment of the inherent salutary potential of the Durham Rule, or for
a continued rejection of its principles in favor of some new rule or
the retention of the old as modified and variously applied in the
jurisdictions other than New Hampshire and the District of Colum-
bia, is a matter of crystal-gazing, not analysis.'0
53. See, e. g., Lowrey, Psychic Determinism and Responsibility 561, reprinted
from 27 PSYCHIATRC QuARTERIy 543-562 (1953) : "I have been told by judges, even
recently, that they hear psychiatric testimony only because it is the law but do not
allow the testimony to influence their own decisions." But see Wertham, A1 Psychiatrist
Looks at Psychiatry and the Law, 3 BFLo L. REv. 41, 49-50 (1953). See also note 51
supra.
54. For an excellent critique of the Durham decision, see 5 CATHOLIC L. REV.
25-87 (1955).
55. Id. at 53-54.
56. Id. at 53, 75-78.
57. Id. at 53. "In attempting to define insanity in terms of a symptom, the courts
have assumed an impossible role, not merely one for which they have no competence."
See note 2 supra, at 872.
58. Id. at 55, 63, 86.
59. Ibid.
60. But cf. note, 59 DicK. L. Rnv. 169, 171 (1955).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Yet it may not be too presumptuous to conclude that no test
truly superior to those already devised will be forthcoming until
the various schools of psychiatry reach substantial agreement
among themselves as to the meaning of their own terminology so
that laws and decisions made in recognition thereof will become
capable of practical and efficient administration.
J. A. Guzzetta
INCOME TAXATION OF COLLAPSIBLE CORPORATIONS
TWTRODUCTIOir
"Collapse" concerns the practice whereby the dissolution of
a corporation or partnership is availed of as a means to the trans-
formation of ordinary income into long term capital gain. The
technique would be inconsequential but for the attractiveness of
the capital gain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Desire
to convert ordinary income into long term capital gain with re-
sultant preferential tax treatment has been almost boundless.1
Development of the concept of collapse was but the outgrowth of
the discovery of defects in the tax structure of the 1939 Code which
paved the way for such conversions. Subsequent additions and
amendments to the 1939 Code served in some measure to plug the
existing loopholes in the area of corporate taxation. The 1954 Code
has to a degree strengthened the collapsible corporation provisions
of the prior law, and in addition, has introduced loophole plugging
provisions aimed at the prevention of the use of the collapsible
partnership as a device to attain the same end.2 Although the
effectiveness of such provisions awaits judicial expression, interim
analysis of the statute would not be inappropriate.
EARLY DVELOPME-NT OF COLLAPSE
Prior to the effective date of Section 117(m) of the 1939 Code,
a corporation holding appreciated property, but which had not
yet realized taxable gain, had available two procedures whereby
it could benefit its stockholders at capital gain rates by the amount
of the appreciation without incurring to itself adverse tax con-
sequences. The corporation could distribute to its shareholders
1. Murphy, Sale of a Sole Proprietorship--An Irrationale in Three Parts, 9 TAX
L. R -. 309. 310 (1953).
2. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1954). Space limitations prevent
consideration of the collapsible partnership; but note herein INT. Ray. CODE oF 1954, §§ 741
and 751, in effect supplanting G. C. M. 26379, 1950-1 Cum. BULL. 58.
